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SYMPOSIUM

THE ROLE OF RACE-BASED JURY
NULLIFICATION IN AMERICAN CRIMINAL
JUSTICE
FOREWORD
TIMOTHY P. O2NEILL*

This issue of The John Marshall Law Review presents an important dialogue on the issue of jury nullification. It is an adaptation of the transcript of a program held last April 7 at The John
Marshall Law School in Chicago featuring Professor Paul Butler,
Associate Professor at the George Washington University School of
Law; Professor Andrew Leipold, Associate Professor at the University of Illinois College of Law; and the Honorable Charles P.
Kocoras of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. The specific area of discussion was Professor Butler's controversial proposal that African-American jurors should
engage in jury nullification in cases in which an African-American
defendant is charged with a victimless crime.' The broader topic,
however, was what role-if any-jury nullification should play in
the American criminal justice system.
Members of a criminal jury are repeatedly told that their solemn duty is to follow precisely the instructions provided by the
trial judge. Yet all judges and lawyers know that, if a jury wishes
to acquit, its members are free to ignore both facts and law. This
is the doctrine of "jury nullification."
Jury nullification is a venerable doctrine. In fact, the English
legal system and the American legal system can each point to a
landmark case establishing the principle.
In 1670, William Penn's Quaker proselytizing led to his prosecution in London on charges of unlawful assembly.! The judge es* Professor of Law, The John Marshall Law School.
1. Paul Butler, Racially Based Jury Nullification: Black Power in the
CriminalJustice System, 105 YALE L.J. 677 (1995).
2. See Andrew D. Leipold, The Dangers of Race-Based Jury Nullification,
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sentially directed the jury to find Penn guilty. Penn, on the other
hand, argued that the jury should protect freedom of religion by
going "behind" the law and acquitting despite the instructions. After the jury acquitted, the judge fined the jurors for ignoring his
instructions. When one juror, Edward Bushell, refused to pay the
fine, he was prosecuted.3 The Court of Common Pleas held for
Bushell and established that a juror could never be punished for a
verdict." This case became authority for the proposition that, even
if a jury should ignore its instructions and acquit the defendant,
there can be no legal sanction against any member of the jury.
The American counterpart is the libel trial of John Peter Zenger in New York in 1735.' Zenger's attorney, Andrew Hamilton,
urged the jury to ignore the judge's instructions and to acquit Zenger by finding that the common law allowed truth as a defense to
seditious libel. The jury obliged. This is cited as the first famous
American jury nullification case.
Yet jury nullification in America was not originally a celebration of the jury's power to flout the law. Rather, the doctrine went
hand-in-glove with the common understanding that juries traditionally had the power to decide both questions of fact and law.
There was strong evidence of this at both the state and federal
level through the beginning of the twentieth century. Jeffrey
Abramson's We, The Jury cites a 1794 case in which John Jay instructed a civil jury that it had the right to decide both issues of
fact and law. 6 It also cites an 1817 criminal case in which John
Marshall gave a similar instruction to a criminal jury.7 In fact, it
was not until 1895 that the United States Supreme Court finally
held that a federal jury should decide only facts and not law. The
Court in Sparf and Hansen v. United States,8 held that a federal

jury could not become "a law unto themselves," but were bound to
follow the law as given by the trial judge. Yet even today the state
constitutions of both Maryland and Indiana provide that a criminal jury has the right to determine both law and facts.9
Throughout the nineteenth century, then, jury nullification in
America could be explained as the jury's exercise of its prerogative
to find both the facts and law in each case. Under this theory, ju44 UCLA L. REV. 109, 122-23, n.53 (1996).
3. Bushell's Case, 124 Eng. Rep. 1006 (C.P. 1670).
4. See Leipold, supra note 2, at n.53 (citing THOMAS A. GREEN, VERDICT
ACCORDING TO CONSCIENCE: PERSPECTIVES ON THE ENGLISH CRIMINAL TRIAL

JURY 1200-1800 (1985)).
5. See Butler, supra note 1, at 702-03; Leipold, supra note 2, at n.55.
6. JEFFREY ABRAMSON, WE THE JURY: THE JURY SYSTEM AND THE IDEAL

OF DEMOCRACY 38-45 (1994) (citing Georgia v. Brailsford, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 1, 4

(1794) (Jay, C.J.)).

7. ABRAMSON, supra note 6, at 38-45.
8. 156 U.S. 51 (1895).
9. See IND. CONST. art. I, § 19; MD. CONST. (DECL. OF RIGHTS) art. XXIII.
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ries before the Sparf and Hanson decision were not "nullifying"
any law; on the contrary, their decisions actually proclaimed the
law. The rise of the "law/fact" dichotomy limiting the power of
American juries in the twentieth century, however, has necessitated a change in the jurisprudential basis for the rule. Now
courts tend to view nullification as, in the words of the Seventh
Circuit, "just a power, not also a right." ° Thus, a defendant has no
right to tell the jury about the doctrine of nullification."
Yet if a defendant has no right to inform an individual jury of
its right to nullify, what about informing citizens-potential jurors-on a broader scale? The Fully Informed Jury Association was
founded in 1989 with the goal of protecting and publicizing the
right of juries to nullify.' Even if a jury cannot be told of nullification inside a courtroom, the Association contends, there is nothing to prevent citizens from reading about it in newspaper advertisements.
Professor Paul Butler has brought this debate into the scholarly arena with his recent controversial article in the Yale Law
Journal." Citing the huge number of African-Americans imprisoned because of drug convictions, Butler urges African-American
jurors to re-think their legal responsibilities. He contends that in
cases involving African-American defendants being tried for nonviolent, malum prohibitum, "victimless" crimes, an AfricanAmerican juror should begin deliberations with a presumption in
favor of jury nullification. The goal would be to destroy the status
quo and to substitute non-criminal ways of addressing antisocial
conduct.
Professor Andrew Leipold views jury nullification in a very
different light. In a recent article in the Virginia Law Review, he
contends that the doctrine exerts more influence over the criminal
justice system than one might expect.' He argues that jury nullification imposes costs on the system even when it is not exercised
because of procedural rules which exist to allow for its possible use
by a jury. He avers, for example, that the possibile use of jury
nullification is the actual reason for our criminal procedure rules
against special verdicts, judgments as a matter of law, and appeals
by the prosecution. Additionally, he has published a response to
Professor Butler's jury nullification proposal in which he argues
against any program of race-based jury nullification. 5
Judge Charles P. Kocoras, the final member of the panel, has

10. United States v. Kerley, 838 F.2d 932, 938 (7th Cir. 1988).
1L See, e.g., United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
12. ABRAMSON, supra note 6, at 57-58.
13. Butler, supra note 1.
14. Andrew D. Leipold, Rethinking Jury Nullification, 82 VA. L. REV. 253
(1996).
15. Leipold, supra note 2, at 116.
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served as a Judge in United States District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois for the last seventeen years. Prior to his appointment, he served as both First Assistant United States Attorney for the Northern District of Illinois, as well as Deputy Chief
for the Criminal Division and Special Prosecution Division. He
brings a wealth of insight and practical experience to the discussion.
Jury nullification has survived through several centuries of
changes in legal theory. Does it deserve a place in the American
justice system today? If so, what should be its role? These are just
some of the questions addressed in the following discussion.

